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Using Language to Navigate the
Infant Mind
Laura Wagner1 and Laura Lakusta2
1

Ohio State University and 2Montclair State University

ABSTRACT—How do infants represent objects, actions, and

relations in events? In this review, we discuss an approach
to studying this question that begins with linguistic theory—specifically, semantic structures in language. On the
basis of recent research exploring infant cognition and
prominent linguistic analyses, we examine whether infants’ representations of motion events are articulated in
terms of the components proposed by Talmy (1985; e.g.,
path, manner) and whether infants’ event representations
are defined in terms of broad semantic roles (agent, patient, source, goal) as proposed by Jackendoff (1990) and
Dowty (1991). We show how recent findings in infant
cognition are consistent with the idea that the infant’s
representation of events is a close reflection of the linguistic
categories. We especially highlight research that is
explicitly guided by linguistic categories likely to have
correlates in nonlinguistic cognition to illustrate the usefulness of using language to pose questions about early
conceptual representations.
One of the central questions in current developmental science is
‘‘what is the nature of the infant’s representations of the world?’’
Although there is a strong consensus that infants do not see the
world as the ‘‘blooming buzzing confusion’’ suggested by William James (1890/1981, p. 462), researchers are still unclear
as to precisely how they think about objects, actions, and relations. In this article, we discuss a theoretical approach for investigating infant cognition that has been guiding a growing
body of research in the field, including our own. This approach
begins with linguistic theory: Its working hypothesis is that
prelinguistic conceptual representations directly reflect the
semantic structures used by language. Modern linguistic theory
has long been concerned, at least in principle, with how language is grounded in the human mind (e.g., Chomsky, 1965), and
many linguists have explicitly suggested that the structures of
language, particularly the semantic structures, provide direct
Address correspondence to Laura Wagner, 1835 Neil Avenue,
Columbus, OH 43210; e-mail: wagner.602@osu.edu.
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insight into the organization of human cognition (Goldberg,
2006; Jackendoff, 1983, 1990; Langacker, 1991; Pustejovsky,
1995; Talmy, 1985). Our research approach takes these linguists
at their word and examines the claim in the domain of infant
cognition. The advantages to this approach are largely methodological. By starting with linguistic theory, we begin with wellreasoned analyses of semantics that provide a ready-made tool
with which to investigate the infant mind. We know that infants
must eventually acquire these semantic structures as part of
acquiring language, so there must be some kind of relationship
between prelinguistic thought and those structures; the most
straightforward possible relationship would be an isomorphism.
Moreover, the linguistic analyses are clear enough that they
make our working hypothesis falsifiable and therefore useful for
scientific progress.
In this article, we review three prominent linguistic analyses,
each examining a different dimension of the semantics of events:
motion events, thematic and action tiers, and thematic roles.
These analyses are highly complementary with each other and
overlap somewhat in scope. In each section, we review the
central findings from the linguistic theory and then consider
recent research in infant cognition and ask to what extent
infants’ representations reflect these semantic structures. The
infants vary in age across the studies considered, but we refer to
them all as being prelinguistic. We do not mean to suggest that
these infants have no knowledge of language, but only that they
are not yet able to produce or fully comprehend the specific
linguistic elements in question. In some cases, the infancy work
was conducted explicitly within the program identified here: The
research was directly guided by the linguistic concepts. In other
cases, the infancy work was done outside this program, but
our aim is to show how this work can be understood within the
present framework. We conclude by discussing a few general
considerations and implications of this research program.
MOTION EVENTS

In an influential paper, Talmy (1985) proposed that motion
events include several key components: an object that undergoes the motion ( figure), the motion itself, the path over which
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Fig. 1. Talmy’s (1985) analysis of motion event. This example illustrates the semantic elements
comprising a motion event and how they are typically mapped into syntactic structure in English
(e.g., motion 1 manner 5 verb phrase). Other languages show different lexicalization patterns (e.g.,
Spanish: motion1 path 5 verb phrase).

the figure moves, and the object in relation to the figure (reference
object). The complete path expression (path 1 reference object)
can be divided into different types including source paths, in
which the figure moves from a reference object that is its starting
point or source; goal paths, in which the figure moves to a reference object that is its end point or goal; and via paths, in which
the figure moves past the reference object (Jackendoff, 1983).
The cause and the manner of the figure’s movement are
optionally encoded. The sentence the duck waddled from the tree
past the mailbox and into the pool illustrates these semantic
elements and how they map into syntax, as seen in Figure 1.
Are infants’ event representations articulated in this way? Do
they form categories based on the semantic elements Talmy lays
out? Recent research suggests that they might (for a review, see
Pruden, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2008; Pulverman, HirshPasek, Golinkoff, Pruden, & Salkind, 2006). For example, in one
study, infants were familiarized with events depicting an animated
starfish performing various movements (e.g., twisting, bending)
that shared a common path (e.g., over a dot). During test, infants
were presented with an in-category event (novel manner, familiar
path; e.g., toe-touch over a dot) and an out-of-category event
(novel manner, novel path; e.g., toe-touch under a dot). Infants
from 10–12 months of age looked longer at the in-category
(familiar path) events, suggesting that they categorized the events
based on path (Pruden, Hirsh-Pasek, Maguire, & Meyer, 2004).
Other experiments using similar methods showed that 13–15month-old infants categorize manner across varying paths (Pruden
et al., 2004), and 9–11-month-old infants categorize manner
across varying rates (Salkind, Golinkoff, & Brandone, 2005).

Familiarization

The findings reviewed above suggest that infants represent
events in terms of manner and via paths. Other studies suggest
that infants represent goal and source paths as well. Lakusta,
Wagner, O’Hearn, & Landau (2007) familiarized 12-month-old
infants to a motion event of a duck moving to one of two goal
objects (see Fig. 2). After familiarization, the locations of the
goal objects were switched. During test, infants viewed either
the duck move to the same goal as in familiarization (but in a
different location) or to a different goal as in familiarization (but
in the same location). Infants looked longer at the test trials
where the duck moved to a different goal, suggesting that infants
encoded the goal during familiarization and were surprised
when the duck changed its apparent goal at test. In further experiments, infants viewed similar motion events, except the
objects were sources—the duck moved from one of two source
objects. Infants looked longer when the duck moved from a
different source, but only when the source objects were sufficiently salient (i.e., when the objects were big and colorful).
Thus, infants represent goals and sources in motion events,
although their representations of goals seem to be more robust
than their representations of sources.
Together these findings suggest that infants’ event representations are articulated in terms of manner and various kinds
of paths—possibly reflecting the key semantic elements of
manner and via, goal, and source paths suggested by Talmy
(1985). These data suggest that there is an isomorphism between
prelinguistic thought and the semantic structures of language,
and they contribute important information about how infants
represent events in the world. Armed with this knowledge,

Test

Diff Goal/Same Loc

Same Goal/Diff Loc

Fig. 2. In familiarization, the duck moved to one of two goal objects. During intertrial, the researchers switched the objects (moving the first object to the second’s location and vice versa). In
three test trials, the duck moved to a different goal in the same location, and in three test trials, the
duck moved to the same goal in a different location. (Reproduced from Lakusta, Wagner, et al.,
2007, with permission from Taylor and Francis.)
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Familiarization

Test

Same Source/Diff Goal

Diff Source/Same Goal

Fig. 3. In familiarization, the duck moved from one of two salient sources to one of two goal objects.
During intertrial, the researchers did not switch the objects. In three test trials, the duck moved
from the same source to a different goal, and in three test trials, the duck moved from a different
source to the same goal. (Reproduced from Lakusta, Wagner, et al., 2007, with permission from
Taylor and Francis.)

research has further explored the extent to which the isomorphism between prelinguistic thought and language is complete.
In language, there is a robust asymmetry between goals and
sources, with goals having a more prominent role than sources
(e.g., Filip, 2003; Fillmore, 1997; Markovskaya, 2006; Nam,
2004). For example, Nam (2004) argues that, in semantic structure, locative goal paths (e.g., Brian ran to the house) constitute
core events, whereas locative source paths (e.g., Brian ran
from the house) modify the process of the event. This distinction
between core and modifying events corresponds to the distinction between arguments and adjuncts, which have a variety of
linguistic reflexes throughout language, including these particular cases.
Further evidence for the prominence of goals over sources in
language comes from people’s linguistic descriptions of events.
When asked to describe events, children and adults tend to
include the goal but omit the source (e.g., describing a scene in
which a bird flies from a bucket into a pitcher as ‘‘the bird flew
into the pitcher’’ rather than ‘‘the bird flew from the bucket into
the pitcher’’). This bias for goals in event descriptions is broad
and robust—it extends to events in very different conceptual
domains, such as motion by an animate and inanimate figure,
attachment/detachment, change of possession, and change of
state (Lakusta & Landau, 2005, 2007). Do infants also show a
bias for goals over sources in their representations of events?
And, if so, does this goal bias extend to events in different
conceptual domains? If there is a complete isomorphism, then
the relative importance of goals and sources for infants should
reflect the prominence relationship between goals and sources
observed in language. To test this hypothesis, Lakusta, Wagner,
et al. (2007) familiarized 12-month-old infants to a toy duck
moving from one of two source objects to one of two goal objects
(see Fig. 3). During test, infants viewed either the duck move
from a different source to the same goal or from the same source
to a different goal. Infants looked longer at the test trials in which
the duck moved from the same source to a different goal, suggesting that infants encoded the goal during familiarization and
were more surprised at test when the figure changed its apparent
goal rather than its source. Thus far, these results are consistent
with a goal bias in language reflecting a goal bias in prelinguistic
thought.
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However, recent findings suggest that there may also be some
important differences between the linguistic and infant representations of events. Recall that the linguistic goal bias occurs
broadly, extending to motion events with both animate (e.g.,
duck waddling from the tree into the pool) and inanimate figures
(e.g., leaf blowing from the tree into the pool). A complete isomorphism between prelinguistic thought and language would
predict that infants should show the same pattern. Recent
findings suggest that this is not the case. Using a method similar
to the one used by Lakusta, Wagner, et al. (2007), Lakusta and
Carey (2007; Lakusta, Reardon, Oakes, & Carey, 2007) found
that 12-month-old infants show a goal bias for events involving
motion by an animate figure (a self-propelled balloon with a
face) but not for events involving motion by an inanimate figure
(a plain balloon). These results suggest that the intentionality
in the event strongly modulates infants’ encoding of sources and
goals in a way that differs from the structure of language. Further
research will be needed to determine how much language exerts
its unique constraints over the prelinguistic representations.
THEMATIC AND ACTION TIERS

Earlier, we explored whether infants’ event representations are
articulated in terms of the motion event components laid out
by Talmy (1985). In the next two sections of this article, we turn
our attention to two linguistic analyses that focus primarily on
semantic roles in linguistic structure (Dowty, 1991; Jackendoff,
1990). We ask whether and to what extent infants’ event representations are also defined in terms of these roles.
It is now well accepted in many linguistic theories that abstract semantic roles are needed to fully characterize event
structure in sentences. In the sentence The girl makes a sandwich, the arguments of the verb (the girl, the sandwich) have
a very specific semantic relationship to the verb (they are,
respectively, the maker and the makee), but they are also
instantiations of the more general semantic roles of agent and
patient. By appealing to these more abstract roles, linguists are
able to identify commonalities across verbs and verb classes and
general principles for linking syntactic positions to semantic
functions (see Gruber, 1965, and Jackendoff, 1983, among
others).
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Jackendoff (1990) argues that semantic roles fall into two
tiers: a thematic tier that deals with motion and location (i.e., the
spatial structure of the event), and an action tier that deals with
actor–patient relations (i.e., the intentional structure of the
event). Consider the event of a girl kissing a boy. This event has
two participants: a girl and a boy. On the thematic tier, the girl is
the source or the spatial starting point of the action, whereas the
boy is the goal or the end point of the action. By contrast, on the
action tier, the girl is the actor or the initiator of the action,
whereas the boy is the patient or the object affected by the
action. There is no strict one-to-one relation between the roles
on the two tiers. In the event just described, the girl is both the
source and the actor. However, in an event of a girl hopping out
of a car, the girl is the theme and the actor, whereas the car is
the source and not the actor. In general, the relationships between semantic roles in thematic and action tiers vary along
event domains. For example, in transfer events, sources tend to
be actors, whereas in motion events, themes tend to be actors.
Recent research with infants suggests that they represent the
intentional structure of events, one that may correspond to the
action tier in semantic structure. For example, Baldwin, Baird,
Saylor, and Clark (2001) reported that 10- to 11-month-old infants are able to appropriately parse goal-directed action events.
In this study, infants were habituated to a goal-directed action
(e.g., a woman notices a towel on the floor, reaches for it, grasps
it, and then places it on the counter), and during the test, they
either viewed the same action with a pause inserted at a ‘‘natural
breakpoint’’ (e.g., at the end of the event, when the woman
placed the towel on the counter) or the same action with a pause
inserted at an ‘‘unnatural breakpoint’’ (e.g., in the middle of the
event, before the woman placed the towel on the counter). Infants looked longer at the test events that had an ‘‘unnatural
breakpoint,’’ suggesting that, during habituation, they parsed
the event along the event’s natural breakpoints and are thus
sensitive to the structure of goal-directed actions.
Further evidence that infants represent the intentional
structure of events comes from Woodward (1998). In this study,
5-, 6-, and 9-month-old infants were habituated to a human hand
reaching for one of two objects (a ball or a teddy bear). At test,
the locations of the objects were switched, and infants viewed
the hand reach for either a different object (in the old location) or
to a different location (with the old object). Infants looked longer
when the hand reached for a different object, suggesting that
they encoded the goal object as a relevant component of the
event. Critically, infants in another condition saw the same
sequence of events with a mechanical claw instead of a human
hand. These infants did not look longer when the claw reached to
a different object. These results suggest that infants as young as
5 months represent a human grasp, but not a mechanical grasp,
as an intentional action: one that is directed toward a particular
goal object. Additional studies by Woodward and colleagues
(Guajardo & Woodward, 2004; Woodward, 1999; Woodward &
Somerville, 2000) and Baillargeon and colleagues (Luo &
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Baillargeon, 2005) lend support to this interpretation that infants make different inferences about the relationship between
event participants when they perceive an intentional dimension
to the event.
The fact that intentionality makes a difference for infants
suggests that they have representations consistent with the
action tier in Jackendoff’s linguistic analysis. Do infants also
represent the spatial structure of the event, corresponding to
Jackendoff’s thematic tier? Research by Gergely, Csibra, and
colleagues suggests that infants may often use a nonmentalistic
interpretation of events more compatible with the thematic
tier (see Gergely & Csibra, 2003, for a review). They argue that
infants represent the external features of an event, such as
the patterns of motion, the environmental constraints, and the
ultimate destinations—all elements that can largely be defined
spatially. They also invoke the principle of rationality, which
states that endings should be achieved by the most efficient
means possible and in which efficiency is again largely defined in
spatiotemporal terms, such as the shortest path between points.
To illustrate, in one study (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro,
1995), 12-month-old infants were habituated to an animated
circle that jumped over a barrier and contacted another circle.
During test, the barrier was removed, and infants viewed two
events: in one, the moving circle performed the same jumping
behavior despite the absence of a barrier to motivate it; in the
other, the moving circle simply traced a direct path to the other
circle. Infants dishabituated only to the events with the jumping
path, suggesting that they were surprised at the inefficiency or
irrationality of such a path in this case. Further studies have
shown that infants can reason about goal states, action patterns,
and situational constraints in accord with the rationality principle (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Wagner & Carey,
2005).
It is a question for future research of whether this work clearly
demonstrates an analysis parallel to Jackendoff’s thematic tier.
In Gergely and Csibra’s theorizing, the external, spatial analysis
is taken to be primary, and the representations that support it are
intended explicitly to be nonmentalistic. However, the principle
of rational action needed to bind the components together certainly goes beyond the spatial analysis required of the thematic
tier. Nevertheless, these data suggest that the spatial analysis is
a critical element of infant cognition.
In sum, it appears that infants’ representations reflect at least
the basic components of the semantic structure of events as
proposed by Jackendoff (1990)—they have both an intentional
and a (mostly) spatial analysis of events. Further research will be
needed to determine how extensive the isomorphism is between
Jackendoff’s tiers and infants’ representations. For example, do
infants understand that a single element can receive both a
spatial and an intentional analysis? Moreover, do they make the
systematic links used in language, such as expecting an intentional actor (on the action tier) to also be a spatial source (on the
thematic tier)?
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THEMATIC PROTO-ROLES

Beyond the two different analyses of semantic roles (spatial vs.
intentional), there is also the question of how many and precisely
which roles are used by language. There are many specific
theoretical treatments of this question, but we appeal here to the
approach laid out in Dowty (1991).
Dowty proposed that only two roles were needed to account for
the relevant semantic properties and linkings between those
roles and syntactic structures: proto-agent and proto-patient.
Both proto roles consist of a set of prototypical features, none
of which is necessary or sufficient. A proto-agent is volitional,
sentient, and causal; it moves and it exists independently from
the event. A proto-patient is something that undergoes a change
of state, often in stages, is causally affected by the event, does
not exist independently from the event, and is stationary relative
to other participants. In the sentence The girl makes a sandwich,
the girl has all the features of a proto-agent, and the sandwich has
all the features of a proto-patient. The central principle of
syntactic linking for Dowty is that, in basic active sentences, the
best proto-agent will appear as the subject of the sentence and
the best proto-patient will appear as the direct object, just as the
example sentence illustrates.
Of course, not all arguments fulfill every prototypical feature
(e.g., the agent and subject of The train hit the car is neither
sentient nor volitional; the patient and object of The girl kicked
the ball is not stationary and exists independently), but the
prototypicality of the arguments strongly influences how it is
linked into the syntax (see Dowty, 1991, for a complete discussion of the intricacies of this theoretical approach). We can
now ask, do infants characterize events in terms of roles, and to
the extent that they do, do they identify those roles with the same
features proposed by Dowty?
In the infancy literature, the most extensive and relevant work
has been done on infant understanding of causality, which is
central to defining the proto-roles: Proto-agents cause things to
happen, and proto-patients undergo change. Seminal work on
infant causality (Leslie & Keeble, 1987) used Michotte-style
launching events (cf. Michotte, 1963). Infants were shown either
a causal event, such as one ball hitting another and thereby
launching it, or they were shown a noncausal version of the
event, in which the first ball hit another ball, but the second ball
moved after a delay (so the first ball could not have launched the
second by normal mechanical means). By 6 months of age, infants who had habituated to the causal launching event dishabituated if the roles of the balls were reversed. That is, infants
appeared to have assigned the first ball the role of causer and the
second ball the role of causee, and they recognized a difference
if the balls switched roles. By contrast, infants who were habituated to the noncausal event did not dishabituate when the
balls switched the order of the motions. That is, simply being the
ball that moved first was not enough for infants at this age to
assign enduring roles.
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These results suggest that infants’ concepts share at least two
important properties with Dowty’s proto-roles. First, they suggest that infants are capable of assigning roles to objects, at least
within a single event, and second, they suggest that causality is
a critical factor in role assignment just as it is important in
defining proto-roles. More recent work on causality has suggested that infants may also link the features of sentience and
volition to proto-agents. In a study by Saxe, Tenenbaum, and
Carey (2005), 10- and 12-month-old infants were habituated to
an event in which an object was tossed over different sized
barriers. Saxe et al. argued that infants would perceive this event
as causal and infer a causal agent of the event even though none
was seen during the habituation phase. At test, infants were
shown a human hand emerging after the event, either from the
same side the object was tossed from or from the opposing side.
Infants looked longer when they saw the hand emerge from
the opposing side, as if they had in fact inferred a causal agent
and expected it to be in a position to produce the cause. Moreover, infants showed no looking preference when what emerged
after the event was an inanimate object (a toy train) rather than a
human hand. This result suggests that infants both inferred a
causal agent and expected that agent to be sentient in some way.
Finally, when the tossed object had a face and had previously
been shown to be able to move on its own, infants showed no
preference for which side the hand appeared. This result suggests infants can assign the causal agent role to something that
appears to move of its own volition. (See also Saxe & Carey,
2006, and Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2007, for additional findings
and discussion.)1
To the best of our knowledge, none of the infancy work on
causality has explicitly invoked Dowty’s proto-roles in their
analysis of infants’ understanding. However, the results from
this literature are highly consistent with the idea that infants
assign semantic roles to events and that the bases for their
assignment are at least consistent with the features Dowty
proposed. Of course, further research in this area is necessary to
determine how infants assign roles to event participants (see
Gordon, 2004) and to pin down whether infants’ conceptions of
event roles align completely with Dowty’s proto-roles.
BEYOND EVENTS

We have focused our discussion on three dimensions within the
semantics and cognition of events, but the general approach of
using linguistic analyses to investigate infant representations
can be applied more widely, as seen in other studies. For example, current investigations of infants’ spatial concepts have
1

We limit our discussion to evidence most directly related to the idea that
infants represent objects as taking on roles in events—roles that may be homologous to the semantic roles proposed by Dowty (1991). However, the interested reader should also refer to the work by Waxman and Braun (2005),
Wilcox (1999), Xu (1999), and others, which sheds light on the information that
infants may use for object categorization and individuation tasks.
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made extensive use of linguistic analyses to guide their research
questions (Bowerman & Choi, 2001; Casasola & Cohen, 2002;
Hespos & Spelke, 2004; McDonough, Choi, & Mandler, 2003).
Of central interest is how infant representations stack up against
the variety of ways that different languages encode spatial relations: for example, Spanish en covers both English in and on,
and Korean distinguishes between a tight-fitting on (one Lego
block on another) and a loose-fitting on (a book on a table). The
results thus far suggest infants are quite flexible in their ability
to categorize spatial relations, although their ability to find
specific relations develops over time (see discussion in the next
section). Other work looking at infants’ concepts of objects and
nonsolid substances (Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando,
2002; Xu & Carey, 1996) has been highly influenced by a parallel distinction found in many languages between count nouns
(which refer to individuateable objects such as tables and turtles) and mass nouns (which refer to nonindividuated stuff, such
as water and rice). Recent investigations in this area suggest that
infants reason quite differently about items in the world that
are individuateable (solid objects) and those that are nonindividuated stuff (such as sand). In this domain, infants appear
to be sensitive from early on to this primary division among
elements in the physical, as well as linguistic, world.
ABSTRACTION IN LANGUAGE AND INFANT
REPRESENTATIONS

The categories and semantic structures of language are very
abstract: Notions such as path, manner, goal, and proto-agent are
used broadly and cut across a wide variety of specific instances.
The explanatory power of linguistic analyses depends in part on
the way in which they account for particular examples from
general principles. Actual research with infants, of course, requires the researcher to choose specific items to test, and there is
some evidence that infants in many cases form quite narrow,
concrete representations of those items. For example, Casasola
and Cohen (2002) examined 10- and 18-month-old infants’
representations of spatial relations such as containment (in),
support (on), and tight fit (kkita). They found that both groups of
infants showed evidence of an abstract category of containment;
when habituated to in events, infants generalized to new in
events during test. However, only the 18-month-olds showed
evidence for a support and tight fit category, and this category
was quite narrow—infants were able to discriminate different
spatial relationships of on only if they were displayed using
previously familiarized toys. They did not notice a new spatial
relationship of on if it involved new toys. Researchers have
found a similar trajectory from a limited, concrete understanding to more abstract, general representations for infants’ ability
to find roles in causal events (Cohen, Rundell, Spellman, &
Cashon, 1999).
Recent work on infants’ understanding of occlusion and
containment events (Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001) has also
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shown a developmental pattern of concrete to abstract representations. Infants’ ability to track object information initially
depends on the specific event it is in: thus, 4-month-olds will
keep track of an object’s height in the context of an occlusion
event (where height is critical) but not in the context of a containment event (where it is not). The fact that infants’ object
analysis is tied directly to specific events suggests that the same
may hold for young infants’ event representations; infants might
initially be forming very specific event roles (such as hider and
hidee) rather than a more general, abstract thematic analysis.
Note, however, that Hespos and Baillargeon’s data also suggest
that infants’ object understanding becomes far less restricted
after 7 months of age.
To the extent that infants’ representations are tied to specific
concrete instances, they are very different from the abstract,
general representations appealed to by the linguistic accounts.
If such representations truly underlie infant cognition, it suggests that there may be only a very weak connection between
them and the semantic structures of language, and certainly not
a complete isomorphism. However, there is evidence that infants
are not incapable of forming abstract categories, they are simply
easily distracted by concrete details.
For example, Maguire et al. (2001) asked whether infants
would form general categories of actions that could be linked to
new verbs. Infants were habituated to several people doing an
unusual action (such as one might see in an aerobics class) and
at test were asked to discriminate between someone doing the
same action and a different one. Infants aged 18 months failed at
this task, as if they did not see the similarity in the action across
the people. It is interesting to note, however, that infants succeeded if the actions of each different person were shown more
abstractly as point light displays. Infants were capable of
forming the general representation of the action itself; they were
simply highly distracted by the specifics of the individual actors.
Similar results have been found in the domain of infant causality.
Infants as young as 6 months old are able to assign roles to the
different participants in an event if the participants are abstract,
such as the simple balls used in Leslie and Keeble (1987). When
these items are replaced with real toys (such as a toy car and a
toy train), infants are not able to assign the roles until several
months later (Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Oakes & Cohen, 1990). The
fact that it takes time for infants to learn how to integrate specific
instances into abstract categories need not undermine the idea
that those abstractions are present initially (see also Lakusta,
2008, for evidence suggesting that infants’ representations of
goals extend beyond a specific event by at least 14 months of
age).2
2

Some of the research described in this section (and elsewhere in this article)
has been carried out explicitly to determine whether the acquisition of particular linguistic forms might influence the presence and/or organization of
nonlinguistic concepts. Our approach to language and thought is fundamentally
orthogonal to this so-called Whorfian question: The linguistic analyses of events
taken up here are quite general, and to the best of our knowledge, have uni-
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GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

As we have seen, our research question is only just beginning to
be addressed empirically, and it is currently unclear whether
prelinguistic thought more, or perhaps less, directly reflects the
semantics of language. There appear to be clear cases in which
infants’ understanding corresponds quite closely with the categories used by language, as in the three cases described above.
However, there are cases where the organization of early thought
may truly differ from the organization in linguistic structure.
Ultimately, the specific relationship between prelinguistic
thought and the structure of language has important implications about the evolutionary development of language and the
specific learning mechanisms used by children in acquiring
language.
To the extent that prelinguistic thought is substantially
different from linguistic structures, it will become critical to
account for the origin of the linguistic structures. From an
evolutionary perspective, differences would suggest that language did not arise directly out of preexisting cognitive structures but that it may have been the result of an evolutionary
break (as has been suggested by Chomsky, 1988). Extensive
differences also raises the possibility that the acquisition of
language could have a radical impact on the development
of thought, as the semantics that organize language would be
fundamentally different from the concepts that organize prelinguistic thought.
On the other hand, if prelinguistic thought is highly similar to
linguistic structures, then we would expect there to be a large
degree of continuity in development. Evolutionarily, such similarity would suggest that the linguistic semantics were built off
of existing cognitive structures, and we might expect to find
equivalent structures in other species. Similarly, the process of
learning linguistic semantics would consist of some variant of a
mapping procedure. The basic function of the learning mechanism would be to link existing concepts into particular linguistic
structures, with the greatest challenges coming from the points
where language groups distinguishable concepts together and in
explaining how children learn the different groupings of concepts that occur cross-linguistically.
CONCLUSIONS

We have outlined a research approach that begins with linguistic
theory and uses it as a means for guiding investigations into
infant cognition. For researchers who are primarily interested
in the origins of cognition, the advantages of this program are
primarily pragmatic. The linguistic analyses have the virtue of
versal application. Specific languages might vary in precisely how these analyses are lexically and structurally manifested (Talmy, 1985, discusses this
point in detail), but the underlying structure is proposed to be universal. It is
this underlying, universal structure that guides our hypotheses about prelinguistic thought. To the extent that this underlying structure is not universal,
then language is not a neutral window on the nature of prelinguistic thought.
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being independently important in adult cognition and also being
specific about content. They therefore serve as a useful tool for
generating specific, testable hypotheses about the nature of the
infant mind. Moreover, for researchers who are also interested in
the origins of the language faculty, this research program is
critical for understanding the ontogenetic (and possibly also the
phylogenetic) origins of language itself.
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